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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The

sole

questions

presented

by Petitioners

for

review are itemized on Pages 1-2 of Petitioner's Petition.
Respondent

Overland

Thrift

& Loan

("Respondent Overland")

asserts no issues for review herein and further asserts that
all issues presented by Petitioners were correctly reviewed
and

adjudicated

by

the

District

Court

and

the Court

of

Appeals.
TRANSCRIPT OF OPINION
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals for which
Petitioner seeks review is reported at 818 P. 2d 1316. A true
and accurate

copy of such opinion as reported

therein is

attached hereto as Appendix A.
JURISDICTION
The opinion of which Petitioners seek review was
filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals on October 17,
1991.

On November 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals entered an

order denying Petitioners' request for rehearing.
Overland

acknowledges

that

the

Supreme

Court

Respondent
has

sole

discretion to grant or deny a petition for writ of certiorari
or to review Court of Appeals decisions pursuant to § 78-22(5) Utah Code Ann. (1989, as amended).

Respondent Overland

also asserts that the considerations and guidelines set forth
in

Rule

46

of

the

Utah

Rules

1

of

Appellate

Procedure

( "U. R. A. P. ,f) ,

while

neither

controlling

nor

exhaustive,

present general guidelines for segregating issues appropriate
for this Court's consideration and judicial

intervention.1

All such relevant jurisdictional provisions are set forth and
included in Appendix B.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
All relevant statutory provisions pertaining to the
issues presented by Petitioner are set forth in their entirety
in Appendix C.

These provisions include the following:

§ 57-1-32, Utah Code Ann. (1985, as amended),
§ 48-1-12 Utah Code Ann. (1953).
§ 70A-1-201(37) Utah Code Ann. (1990, as amended)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CASE HISTORY
This action was originally filed by Petitioners Dale
L. Larson, Grethe Larson, and Systematic Builders, Inc. in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
and

(R. 002)

on March

Nearly three years after its original filing,
1,

1990, March

27, 1990, and May

14, 1990,

respectively, the District Court granted a series of motions
for partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents herein•

1

Respondent Overland contends that the issues presented by Petitioners in the instant case fail to satisfy the general
and basic categories set forth by Rule 46 o\ the Utah Rules o( Appellate Procedure, and thus fails even the most basic qualifying
guidelines.

2

(R. 845-847, 936-940,

1018-1021)

Pursuant

to

such

court

adjudications and an oral stipulation between the parties, the
District

Court

certified

such

partial

summary

judgment

collectively as a final judgment on June 26, 1990, pursuant to
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 1037-1038)

Petitioners filed an Amended Notice of Appeal in the
Supreme Court on July 6, 1990.

(R. 1047)

On July 31, 1990,

the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and 78-2A-3(2) (j ) , Utah Code
Ann. (1990, as amended).
On or about June 20, 1991, after duly filing briefs
in accordance with the respective positions, oral arguments
were heard by the Court of Appeals.

On or about October 17,

1991, the Court of Appeals filed with the Clerk of the Court
its Opinion in the matter ("Opinion11), a copy of which is set
forth in its entirety

in Appendix A herein.

(Appendix A)

Petitioners thereafter filed a Request for Rehearing, which
request was denied by order of the Utah Court of Appeals dated
November 15, 1991.

Petitioners petitioned this Court for a

Writ of Certiorari on or about December 16, 1991.
NATURE OF THE CASE
* "ff'On or about November 27, 1984, Robert J. Lucking and
Dale L. Larson dba L&L Wire, EDM, a Utah partnership,
Wire11)

executed

and

delivered

to

PFC,

Inc.

("L&L

("PFC")

a

commercial lease ("Lease"), pertaining to the lease of certain

3

industrial equipment ("Equipment").

(R. 675; Deposition of

Robert Lucking, Pg. 66, Lines 10-13; Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318)
Robert Lucking is the son-in-law of Plaintiff DaLe L. Larson.
(Deposition of Dale L. Larson, Pg. 7, Lines 19-20).
In conjunction with the lease, Plaintiff Dale L.
Larson

("Dale

Larson")

executed

and

delivered

to

PFC a

personal equipment lease guaranty ("Guaranty") guaranteeing
all amounts to become due and owing under the terms of the
Lease.

(Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318; R. 677; R. 663-667)
In order

to provide

additional

security

for the

payment of obligations arising under the Lease, Plaintiff
Grethe Larson ("Grethe Larson"), wife of Dale Larson, executed
a trust deed ("Trust Deed") on a home owned by Dale Larson and
Grethe Larson as joint tenants.

(Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318; R.

103; R. 654-656; Deposition of Grethe Larson, Pg. 69-70, 72,
74-75, 77) Grethe Larson allegedly signed both her own name
and the name of her husband to the Trust Deed.

(Opinion, 818

P.2d 1318; R. 103; Deposition of Grethe Larson, Pg. 69-70, 72,
74-75, 77)
At no time prior to the filing of this action did
Respond^wt^ Overland

Thrift

& Loan

("Overland")

know

that

Grethe Larson had signed the name of her husband to the Trust
Deed.

(R. 080)

4

On
interests

or

of

about

PFC

November

in and

assigned to Overland.

28,

to the

1984, all

Lease

and

rights

Guaranty

and
were

(Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318)

Thereafter, L&L Wire defaulted under the terms of
the Lease.

(Opinion, 818 P.2d

1318; R. 078-079)

Robert

Lucking subsequently filed bankruptcy.
After

numerous

unsuccessful

attempts

to

obtain

payment, Respondent Overland caused the Trust Deed to record
a Notice of Default and Election to Sale on January 24, 1987.
(R. 022-023)

Respondent Overland repossessed the equipment on

February 15, 1987 (R. 234, 236) and placed the equipment for
advertisement and sale with Utah Machine Tool Exchange, a
widely

recognized

equipment sales.

dealer

in

(R. 954)

industrial

machine

sales

and

After full compliance with all

statutory requirements regarding the sale of real property, a
Trustee's Sale of the real property was subsequently held on
May 27, 1987, and a Trustee's Deed was delivered to Overland
as purchaser of the real property.

(R. 923, 927-928)

On May 19, 1987, Petitioners commenced this action
by filing the first of six complaints seeking to void the
Trust Deed and enjoin the Trustee's Sale.
158, 245-251, 278-288, 332-335, 392-413)
counterclaimed

asserting

among

recover

the

of

under

terns

other

the

5

(R. 002-003, 155Respondent Overland

things,

Lease

and

a

the

right

to

Guaranty,

declaratory relief as to the interest of Grethe Larson and
unjust enrichment.
On March 1, 1990, pursuant to a Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Respondents Linda Milne and Western Surety,
the

District

respondents.

Court

dismissed

all

claims

against

said

(Opinion, 818 P.2d 1318; R. 845-846)

On March 27, 1990, pursuant to Respondent Overland7s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 640-718) , the court
granted partial summary judgment on several distinct issues.
(R. 936-939, 1054)

Such issues included:

(1) entitlement to

dismissal of Systematic Builders, Inc. ("Systematic") since
Systematic

had

neither

made

an

express

claim

against

Respondent Overland nor had Overland been able to discovery
any involvement of Systematic in the transaction
(2) entitlement
transfer

and

to

summary

severance

of

judgment
the

with

joint

(R. 937);

respect

tenancy

to

the

interest

of

Petitioner Grethe Larson in the deeded real property (R. 937) ;
(3) entitlement to a judgment on liability

issues against

Petitioner Dale L. Larson under the terms of the Guaranty
(R. 938) ; and (4) entitlement to summary judgment on liability
issues against Petitioner Dale Larson on the Lease pursuant to
his

status

as

partner

of

L&L

Wire

(R.

938);

(5)

a

determination that the Lease constituted a true lease as a
matter of law (R. 938) ; (6) that Petitioners had failed after
three years to provide any evidence of fraud or duress, and

6

that all claims of fraud should be dismissed (R. 937) ; and (7)
that summary judgment regarding claims of double recovery and
penalty be granted since Respondent Overland was seeking to
recover

only

amounts

(Opinion, 818 P.2d

due

after

offset

of

sale

proceeds

1318-1319; R. 938-939)

On May 14, 1990, and pursuant to a second Motion for
Summary Judgment on issues remaining unresolved
adjudications,
summary

the

court

judgment.

again

(Opinion,

awarded

818

P.2d

Respondent
1319; R.

Such motion was unopposed by Petitioners.
court determined:

by previous
Overland

1018-1021)

Specifically, the

(1) the equipment leased pursuant to the

Lease had been sold and otherwise disposed of by Respondent
Overland in good faith (Opinion, 818 P.2d 1319; R. 1019); and
(2) the amount of liability

accruing

to Petitioner

Larson under the terms of the Lease and Guaranty.
818 P.2d

1319; R.
One

Dale L.
(Opinion,

1010-1020)

remaining

issue

regarding

the

authority

of

Petitioner Grethe Larson to execute the Trust Deed for and on
behalf

of Petitioner

Dale

L. Larson was withdrawn

from the

litigation pursuant to stipulation between the parties. 2

(R.

1037-1038)

( h e i l a n d d e t e r m i n e d th.it MIH<.

••

I . i i s n n tind u n d e i the I case e x e c u t e d I n ins , > * i
the r e m a i n i n g issue o l w h e t h e i D a l e I . n s o n • , . "
Such i e a l p i o p e i t \

interest c o u l d I K .md A is -

•. 'i id ' ^ e n d c t e i m m e d to exist b o t h u n d e r the G u a r a n t y signed by D a l e
K<>IH n I c a k i n g , t h e i e \sas l i t t l e e c o n o m i c b e n e h t in c o n t i n u i n g t o p u r s u e
. d . • ' . m s k i ol his interest m the real p r o p e r t y by means o( the T r u s t D e e d .
. , .< m , \ i . h i . u n c d I n means o l e x e c u t i o n s.ile p u r s u a n t t o the a d j u d i c a t e d

li<ibiht\ u n d e i b o t h the I ease <md ( m a i m i \

7

On June 18, 1990, the Petitioners filed a Notice of
Appeal.
Utah

(R. 1033)

Rules

of

On June 26, 1990, pursuant to Rule 54(b),

Civil

Procedure,

the

Court

certified

its

previous orders granting summary judgment as a final judgment.
(R. 1037-1038)

On July 6, 1989, Petitioners filed an Amended

Notice of Appeal.

(R. 1047-1048)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners have failed to assert any issues which
(1) demonstrate
departed

a conflict

of

law;

(2) which

are so far

from the usual course of judicial proceedings to

warrant Supreme Court supervision; or (3) which present any
special or important grounds for review.
Petitioners raise in their Petition several issues,
which are either issues of first impression herein, issues of
first impression in the Court of Appeals, or issues which were
uncontested by Petitioners in the District Court.

Such issues

include

foreclosure

non-conformance

with

statutory

requirements3, issues of alleged satisfaction of liability,
and awards of attorneys fees.

Such issues are now improperly

brought for review and therefore do not warrant Supreme Court
supervision.
Additionally, the District Court and the Court of
Appeals correctly determined the instant Lease to be a true

3

A s evidenced by the Petition. IYMIMOIKI-N ha^c tailed to identity any actual and specific failures, but rather allege only

general unspecified failure

8

lease rather than a security agreement.

There was at no time

any dispute regarding the content of the Lease.
have

contested

document.

only

the

legal

The parties

characterization

of

the

Consistent with controlling case law, governing

statutory provisions, and looking to the express language of
the Lease, the lower courts correctly characterized the Lease
as a true lease as a matter of law.
allegations

that

the

mere

Petitioners' unsupported

existence

of

certain

Colonial

Leasing factors creates ambiguity are misplaced and contrary
to existing law.
Moreover, Petitioners7
Western

and

Milne

claims against Respondents

are wholly without

legal

foundation

or

evidentiary support.

The alleged improper notarization and

subsequent

bear

recording

damages allegedly

no

causal

relationship

sustained by Petitioners.

to

the

The sole and

singular source of Petitioner Dale Larson's alleged damages
was his own wife's forgery of his name to the Trust Deed,
since

the

Trust

Deed

was

an

enforceable

instrument

irrespective of its recorded status.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONFIRMED OVERLAND'S
JUDGMENT AGAINST PETITIONER DALE LARSON UNDER THE TERMS
OF THE EQUIPMENT LEASE GUARANTY
Petitioners assert that the Utah Court of Appeals

erred in confirming Overland's judgment against Dale Larson
under the terms of the Equipment Lease Guaranty ("Guaranty").
9

(Petition, Pg. 6) A true and correct copy of such Guaranty is
attached hereto as Appendix D and incorporated herein by this
reference.
First,
judgment

was

Petitioners

improper

upon

generally
the

assert

grounds

that

that

such

Respondent

Overland allegedly failed to follow the statutory procedures
set forth

in § 57-1-32, U . C A .

However, Petitioners have

failed to identify, either in its Petition herein or in the
lower courts any specific alleged failure. As demonstrated by
the record, there is no such alleged failures.
Petitioners also generally

allege that the Lease

obligation had been fully satisfied.
have

never

presented

any

evidence

However, Petitioners
below

that

the

Lease

obligations had been satisfied, or the remaining balance at
the time of sale was $33,198.98 as asserted in their Petition.
(Petition, Pg. 7)
any

response

In fact, Petitioners failed to even file

to Respondent

Overland's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment regarding damages sustained and the accounting of
Respondent Overland under the Lease.

Not only is there no

reference in the record to the assertions made by Petitioners
herein, but Petitioners may not now be heard to seek review of
determinations which were uncontested by Petitioners in the
lower court.

The Supreme Court will not review alleged error

when no objection at all is made at the trial level.

10

Lopez v.

Schwendiman, 720 P.2d.

778 (Utah 1986); Berrett v. Stevens,

690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984).
Petitioners also fail to recognize that the Guaranty
Agreement contested by Petitioners constitutes a contractual
obligation completely

separate and distinct

from the Lease.

Consequently, Respondent Overland was fully entitled to seek
breach of contract damages under the terms of the Guaranty.
Petitioners

also

assert

without

explanation

that

Overland has been allowed double recovery on a single claim.
(Petition,

Pg.

7).

After

reviewing

such

assertions,

the

arguments presented by Petitioners, and the cases presented in
conjunction therewith, both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals determined such claim to be meritless.
cited

by

Plaintiffs

Industry

Financial

in

support

of

Corp. v. Redmond,

such

The cases

arguments,

383 N.W.

namely

2d 847

(N.D.

1986) and Southwest Park Patient, Ltd. v. Chandler, 572 S.W.2d
53 (1978) were not applicable to the facts of this case.

(R.

811; Petitioners' Court of Appeals Brief, Pg. 1 2 ) . Such cases
involved leases in which the lessor attempted to recover the
full value of remaining

lease payments without granting

the

lessee an appropriate offset for the value of the equipment
returned.
provide
created,

Such courts stated that where a lessor

such

an

thereby

offset,

a

creating

penalty
an

of

double

inconsistency

fails to

recovery
with

is

general

contract principals, which seek to award damages only in the

11

amount of actual damages sustained.

The District Court and

the Court of Appeals dismissed such claims upon determining
Overland had a right to recover amounts due under the Lease
after offset of equipment sale proceeds.

(Opinion, 818 P.2d

1321).

fact

Such

Petitioners.

sale

proceeds

were

in

credited

to

(R. 963-964)

Finally, Petitioners argue that the lower courts7
award

of attorneys

fees was

improper.

assertions, the District Court

found

Contrary

to

such an award

such
to be

proper based upon affidavit evidence submitted by Overland as
well

as

Petitioners7

complete

Respondent's motion for such fees.

lack

of

opposition

to

Moreover, at the time of

the award, the District Court had before it the volumes of
records generated over three years of litigation, and was well
aware of the reasonable fees incurred by the Respondent.

The

Court of Appeals declined to consider the issue by stating:
The Larsons challenge the award of attorney's fees
by the trial court as an additional issue on appeal.
The issue was not listed in the statement of issues
presented for review in their opening brief, but was
raised for the first time in their Reply Brief.
Rule 24(c) of the Appellate Rules of Procedure
limits answers in a reply brief to new matter in the
appellee's brief. The issue of attorneys fees was
not raised as a new matter, either directly or by
inference,
in appellee's
brief.
We
decline
consideration
of the argument, therefore, for
failure to comply with briefing requirement of the
rules.
See Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72
(Utah App. 1991) ; Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987). See
also Demetropolous v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1988) .
12

(Opinion, 818 P.2d 1321)

Since such issue was never contested

at the trial court level, and was improperly raised on appeal,
this

Court

should

also

deny

consideration

Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d.

of

such

claims.

778 (Utah 1986); Berrett v.

Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984).
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY
DETERMINED THE LEASE TO BE A TRUE LEASE AS A MATTER OF
LAW
Petitioners' assertions that the District Court and

the Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted the Lease to be
a true

lease as a matter

merit.

The Court of Appeals exhaustively reviewed the Lease

provisions

as

well

as

of law are without

the

precedent

foundation

and

or

controlling

considerations utilized in characterizing a document as a true
lease or a security agreement.
Colonial

(Opinion. 818 P.2d 1319-1320) ;

Leasing Co. of New England v. Larsen

Co. , 731 P.2d

483

Bros. Const.

(Utah 1986); LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin,

805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991); Utah Code Ann. 70A-1-201(37)).
In

reviewing

District

the

Courts

Lease
found

document,

the

Court

of Appeals

persuasive

and

determinative

and

factors

such as retention of ownership in the equipment, the option to
purchase

the

equipment

at

fair

market

value

upon

Lease

expiration, governing provisions of the Utah Commercial Code,
and the express

language of the Lease.

1319-1321)
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(Opinion, 818 P. 2d

Petitioners have implied in adhock fashion that the
agreement

"may" be ambiguous.

Petition, Pg. 9)

(Appellant

Brief, Pg. 10;

Specifically, Petitioners state:

"in some

cases, the basic nature of the agreement, judging solely from
its contents, may be ambiguous."
emphasis added).

(Appellant's Brief, Pg. 10,

However, Plaintiffs have failed, in all

prior evidentiary or argument presentations to present any
specific evidence that any terms of the Lease are ambiguous or
otherwise

require

parol

evidence

to

decipher

their

true

meaning.
Petitioners
regarding

the express

and

Respondents

language

have never

disagreed

of the Lease, rather they

contested only the legal characterizations of such language.
Utah law is clear that the interpretation of an unambiguous
contract is a question of law when the analysis is based upon
the language of the agreement and not upon extrinsic evidence.
LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d

189, 192

(Utah App.

1991); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985);
Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 790
P.2d

581, 582

(Utah App. 1990).

Contrary to Petitioners'

assertions, the mere existence of Colonial Leasing factors
does

not

create

provisions,

nor

ambiguity,
override

invalidate

the

clear

and

contained in the language of the Lease.

14

express

statutory

expressed

intent

Consequently,

the

District

Court's

dismissal

of

Plaintiff's arguments regarding the lease characterization as
a security

instrument and the Court of Appeals affirmance

thereof were proper and in accordance with controlling Utah
law.
C.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS MILNE AND WESTERN

SUMMARY

Petitioners also seek review of the Court of Appeals
affirmation

of

the

summary

judgment

Respondents Western and Milne.

granted

in

favor

of

Petitioners assert that the

interests of Dale Larson in and to the subject property was
somehow damaged by an alleged wrongful notarization of a deed
which he allegedly did not sign.

Respondent Overland asserts

that Petitioners' conclusions lack causal connection and are
without merit for several reasons.
First, any damaged allegedly suffered by Dale Larson
as a result of the Trust Deed was causally related to his own
wife's signature of his name to the Trust Deed.

But for such

signing which Dale L. Larson claims to be unauthorized, no
alleged damage would have been incurred.
Second, Petitioners have

failed to demonstrate a

causal connection between the notarization and the damages
allegedly sustained.
of execution,

such

While an acknowledgement or other proof
as

a notarization,

is prerequisite

to

recording a deed of trust or other conveyance of real property
under Utah Code Ann. ** -> '-3-1 (1990), neither recording nor
15

notarization is a necessary condition to enforce a trust deed
between parties to a conveyance.

(Opinion, 813 P. 2d 1323;

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(3) (1990); Greqerson v. Jensen, 669
P.2d 396 (Utah 1983); Horman v. Clarkf
App.

1987)).

Thus,

Respondent Overland's

notarization

744 P.2d

had

no

1014 (Utah

bearing

upon

right to foreclose upon the subject

property and no damages can be alleged to arise therefrom.
Moreover,

any

attorneys

fees

incurred

by

Dale

Larson

in

allegedly clearing his name from the Trust Deed were incurred
as a result of his wife signing his name to the Trust Deed and
not by subsequent recording of the Trust Deed.
alleged

damages

cannot

be

causally

Consequently,

connected

to

the

notarization or the subsequent recording of the Trust Deed,
Finally,
damages allegedly
nonexistent.

Respondent
suffered

Overland

asserts

that

by Dale L. Larson are

any

in fact

If Dale Larson did not sign the Trust Deed as

alleged, his interest in and to the subject property was not
and could not be effected by any notarization or recording
thereof.

Consequently,

his

interest

in and

to

the home

remained intact until it was sold to partially satisfy his
liability incurred under the terms of the Guaranty Agreement.
Moreover/ any attorneys fees incurred by Petitioners would
have been incurred regardless of whether the Trust Deed had
been recorded or not, since enforceability was not premised
upon recording.

16

Inasmuch

as

Petitioners

can

offer

absolutely

no

explanation with regard to the causal connection between the
notarization and damages allegedly suffered, and have further
made no evidentiary
properly

awarded

showing

of damages, the District

Respondents

Western

and

Milne

Court

summary

judgment, and such summary judgment was properly affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
D.

PETITIONEES ISSUFS FAIL TO SATISFY
CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES
Rule

regarding
writ

of

46,

U.R.A.P.

the character
certiorari.

of

sets

forth

RULE

general

issues warranting

Such

general

46

guidelines

issuance of a

guidelines,

exhaustive, include instances where:

U.R.A.P.

while

not

(1) a decision is shown

to conflict with a previous decision of another panel of the
Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; (2) a decision of
the

Court

previous

of

Appeals

decision

of

is shown
the

to be

Supreme

in conflict

Court;

with

(3) a decision

the
is

shown to be so far departed trom the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of Supreme
Court power of supervision; or (4) when the Court of Appeals
has

decided

an

important

question

of municipal,

state,

or

federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by the
Supreme Court.
Petitioners
satisfying

any

of

the

have

made

no

aforementioned

clear

demonstration

considerations,

and

therefore have failed to satisfy even the minimal guidelines
17

set forth by Rule 46.
unfavorable

Petitioners merely

determinations

rather

than

seek review of

a

settlement

of

conflict of law issues, or a rectification of decisions "far
departed

from

proceedings."

the

accepted

usual

course

of

judicial

In the absence of specific issue qualification,

and with Petitioners7

failure to provide any absence of a

genuine "special and important reason" upon which to base an
award of writ of certiorari constitutes sufficient grounds for
this Court to exercise its discretion to deny Petitioners'
petition.

See Rule 46 U.R.A.P.
CONCLUSION
For

Overland

all

of

respectfully

the

foregoing

requests

that

reasons,
this

Respondent
Court

deny

Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
DATED this

/£> ~ day of January, 1992.
ALLEN HARDY EVANS RASMUSSEN & JONES

Robert L. Payne, Es
Attorneys for Appellee-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of January,

1992, four true and correct copies of RESPONDENT OVERLAND'S
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was
sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to:

Michael F. Olmstead,

David Eccles Building, Suite #714, 385 - 24th Street, Ogden,
Utah

84401.

**s^^ux—

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

/fe> ^ day of January

1992, I did cause to be hand-delivered four true and accurate
copies

of

RESPONDENT

OVERLAND'S

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to:

BRIEF

IN

OPPOSITION

TO

Joseph T. Dunbeck, Esq.,

WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN, 310 South Main, Suite #1200, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84101.

^
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Co. v. St. Joseph High School Bd. of Fin.
Trustees, 794 P.2d 505 (Utah App.1990), to
support its argument.
In Jacobsen, the court stated "if a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted,
and a judgment satisfied, the controversy
has become moot and the right to appeal is
waived/' Id. at 506 (quoting Jensen v.
Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 156, 514 P 2d 1142,
1143 (1973)). The defendant in Jacobsen
fully paid a judgment and proffered a satisfaction of judgment, which was executed.
Neither party suggested any possibility of
appeal. The defendant later appealed, and
the plaintiff successfully sought to dismiss
the appeal. The defendant alleged that the
appeal involved issues distinct from the
judgment, and claimed that the appeal
should not be dismissed. The defendant
relied on the doctrine that one may partially fulfill a judgment when the portion paid
can clearly be attributed to a claim which is
entirely separate and distinct from the issues appealed. See Jensen, 30 Utah 2d at
157, 514 P.2d at 1143.
West Valley City offered a partial satisfaction to Majestic, which was rejected by
counsel for Majestic, who claimed that a
partial satisfaction cannot be made for a
specific portion of the judgment. A revised
statement of partial satisfaction was executed. Majestic insisted on deletion of any
reference to specific portions of the controversy. Majestic and the City stipulated
that neither party waived any rights to
appeal. Majestic now seeks to avoid the
effect of the very language included to
allay its own concerns—a tactic that is not
only untenable but quite unnecessary given
the strength of its position on the merits.
We hold that the partial satisfaction did not
waive West Valley City's right to this appeal.6
CONCLUSION
Because West Valley City has failed to
properly marshal the evidence and show
6. In condemnation proceedings, Utah law provides a mechanism for prejudgment payment of
a condemnation award. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-9 (1987). We cannot determine from
the record before us whether this statute is
directly applicable. However, we believe the
statute evidences a legislative desire that con-

the court's findings to be clearly erroneous,
the court's factual findings remain undisturbed. No challenge can be raised to the
parol evidence relied on by the trial court
when no objection was mad8 at trial. We
see no error in the court's legal conclusions. The court's decision and award are
affirmed.
BENCH, P.J., and GREENWOOD. J.,
concur.

O

V
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Dale L. LARSON; Grethe Larson; and
Systematic Builders, Inc., Plaintiffs
and Appellants,

OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN; Linda D. Milne; and Western Surety Company, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 900411-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 17, 1991.

Lessee and his wife brought suit
against assignee of lessor's interest in
equipment lease, notary and notary's insurer to rescind deed of trust on home given
as additional security for equipment lease
after lease went into default and assignee
initiated foreclosure on home. The District
Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Daniels, J.,
entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on certain issues, and lessees appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J.,
held that: (1) equipment transaction was
demnation awards, to the extent not disputed,
be paid as speedily as possible even though
disagreement remains about whether more
should be paid. West Valley City's tender of
partial satisfaction seems fully consistent with
this policy.

LARSON v. OVERLA* > THRIFT AND LOAN
Cite as 818 ?J4 13

true lease and not security agreement; (2)
claim of duress was unsupported; ^3) material issue of fact existed precluding summary judgment on claim of fraud; (4)
house was subject to execution, regardless
of nature of guaranty also given by lessees, where house was expressly pledged
as security in lease: and '5i there was no
causal connection between notary s alleged
faise notarization and acknowledgement or
trust document and loss )f r.ome.
Affirmed in part and reversed .n part.
1. Secured Transactions 3=10
Equipment lease was true lease and
not security agreement even thougn :t contained purchase option for purchase of
property at conclusion of lease, where purchase option did not provide for only nominal consideration. U.C.A.1953. 70A-1201(37).
2. Appeal and Error 5=762
Issue raised for first time in reply
brief would not be considered on appeal to
Court of Appeals. Rules App.Proc, Rule
24(c).
3. Judgment <3=>185.3(21)
Defendant was entitled to summary
judgment on claim of duress based on
statements made by plaintiff in her deposition, contrary to her position in pleadings,
that were not later modified by cross-examination at deposition.
4. Judgment <3=>181(33)
Material issue of fact as to whether
lessee was induced to sign trust deed on
home to secure equipment lease based on
fraudulent misrepresentations on which
she reasonably relied precluded summary
judgment on lessees' fraud claim seeking
to cancel trust deed.
5. Mortgages <3=>335
Lessee's house was subject to foreclosure independent of their guaranty of
equipment lease where hou.^e was expressly pledged as additional security in equipment lease and was secured by means of
trust deed; thus foreclosure could be initiated on house regardless <-f nature of guaranty.

Utah
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6. Acknowledgment §=*48
Allegation that trust deed was not
signed in notary's presence could not support fraud claim against notary based on
subsequent foreclosure on home pursuant
to trust deed inasmuch as notarization was
not essential between parties to convey
right to foreclose upon default; trust deed
could have been foreclosed upon whether
or not it was recorded; improper notarization did not create or alter legal relationship between parties, but merely made instrument recordable. U.C.A.I953, 57-3-1,
57-3-2(3).
7. Costs <3=*260(5)
Appellees were entitled tc single costs
and reasonable attorney fees based on appellant's frivolous appeal of determination
that notary's alleged false notarization of
trust deed did not cause appellees to lose
their home through foreclosure where appeal was not accompanied by any legal
argument showing how notarization caused
loss of home or by any good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing
law. Rules App.Proc. Rule 33.

Joseph H. Bottum and David W. Brown,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jeffrey M. Jones, Michael L. Dowdle, and
Robert Payne, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee Overland Thrift and
Loan.
Joseph Dunbeck, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellees Milne, and Western
Sur.
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
A deed of trust was recorded on the
Larsons' home in favor of Overland Thrift
and Loan (Overland) as additional security
for the lease financing of industrial equipment. The lease went into default and
Overland repossessed the equipment and
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initiated foreclosure on the home. The
Larsons sued to rescind the trust deed and
to enjoin the foreclosure sale. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants and the Larsons appeal
following final certification of judgment
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b).
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. FACTS
On November 27, 1984, a lease financing
agreement was entered into between PFC,
a lease broker, as lessor: and. Dale L.
Larson and Robert J. Lucking, partners in
L & L Wire EDM, as lessees, for the fiveyear lease of industrial equipment. The
agreement specifically referred to a home
owned by Dale Larson and Grethe Larson
as additional security pledged for the
leased equipment that had been supplied by
Intermountain Machine Tool (Intermountain). In connection with the lease financing agreement, Dale Larson and Robert
Lucking also signed an equipment lease
guaranty as co-guarantors.
On November 20, 1984, PFC employee
Ray Welling delivered to the Larsons a
trust deed prepared for their signatures.
The trust deed named the Larsons as
grantors of the trust deed on their home
owned in joint tenancy, and Overland as
beneficiary. The trust deed expressly stated it was "being recorded for additional
securing [sic] on a lease for Robert J. Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire EDM
in the amount of $112,185.92 on lease number 312 401 Dated November 7, 1984." After the trust deed was executed, Linda
Milne notarized and recorded it.
The day after the lease financing agreement was signed, PFC formally assigned
its interest in the lease to Overland.
Monthly lease payments were made until
September 2, 1986, when the lease went
into default. A flurry of activity then followed. The Larsons gave Systematic
Builders a warranty deed on their home on
January 21, 1987. Two days later, Overland recorded a Notice of Breach and Election to sell the Larson home and a trustee's
sale was set for May 27, 1987. Systematic
Builders subsequently recorded its warran-

ty deed on February 5, 1987. Overland
repossessed the equipment on February 15.
1987, and sold it for 510,750 over a year
later.
In order to save their home from foreclosure, the Larsons filed suit on May 19,
1987, to rescind the trust deed as a consumer credit transaction under 15 U.S.C.
j 1635(b), and to enjoin the trustee's sale.
Although Dale Larson denied ever signing
the trust deed, Grethe Larson admitted responsibility for placing both his and her
signatures on the deed and the lease, but
claimed she did so because of fraud and
coercion. Grethe Larson also alleged the
notary Linda Milne was not present when
the documents were signed. The district
court denied the Larsons' application for a
preliminary injunction and the real property was sold to Overland for $51,864.90.
The Larsons requested leave to file an
amended complaint and, by August 1, 1988.
had filed four more amended complaints
due, in large part, to their failure adequately to plead fraud. Counterclaims were
filed and, after discovery and depositions,
Milne and Western Surety moved for summary judgement. Overland soon followed
with two separate motions for partial summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion for
summary judgment filed by Milne and
Western Surety and dismissed with prejudice the Larsons' fraud claims against the
notary and the bond company. The court
next granted Overland's motion for partial
summary judgment, and dismissed all
claims asserted by Systematic Builders.
At the same time, the court dismissed the
Larsons' claims against Overland for
"fraud, duress and so on"; ordered the
transfer of Grethe Larson's one-half interest in the Larsons' home to Overland; determined that the "lease" was, as a matter
of law, a true lease and not a security
agreement; ordered that Dale Larson was
fully obligated on the guaranty; entered
judgment against Dale Larson on the lease
due to his status as a partner in L & L
Wire; and, denied the Larsons' claims that
enforcement of the lease allowed double
recovery and penalty because Overland

LARSON v. OVERLA> ) THRIFT AND LOAN
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only sought to recover amounts due after
offset from sale proceeds.
The district court later granted Overland's second motion for partial summary
judgment on the remaining counts: that
the sale of the equipment )y Overland was
made in good faith: and. that Dale Larson
was liable under the lease for S69.883.S0.
The court then certified rh^ judgments as
final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when
there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LMV Leasing,
Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah
App.1991). In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no
genuine issue of material fact, we review
the facts and inferences from them in the
light most favorable to the losing party.
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Pairing, Inc.
v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382. 1385 (Utah
1989). We review conclusions of law for
correctness and give no deference to the
trial court. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Utah v. State of Utah, 779 P 2d 634, 63637 (Utah 1989).
The interpretation of a contract can
present either a question of law, to be
determined by the words of the agreement,
or a question of fact, to be determined by
extrinsic evidence. Kimball v. Campbell,
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 19*5). Interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law and does not require any deference to the conclusions oi the thai court.
LMV Leasing, 805 P 2d at 192. If the
terms of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, we interpret them according to
1. The Larsons present n«. argument that words
are missing within the term* themselves or that
other deficiencies in the contract would have
required extrinsic or parol e\ idence to resolve
any uncertainty. We ^ontlude the terms of the
contract are clear and unambiguous and may be
interpreted in accordance u::h their plain and
ordinary meaning
2.

In Colonial Leasing, the- M.p»-eme court said:
Numerous factors K-ar »>n determining
whether the terms <>l an averment *how that
it was meant to be a lease
a sccuntv agree

Utah
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their plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic or parol evidence is generally not
admissible to explain the intent of the parties. Faulkner v. Famsworth, 665 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Valley Bank &
Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.. 776
P.2d 933, 936 (Utah App.1989).
Language is ambiguous if the words
used to express the intent n the parties
are insufficient so that the :ontract may be
understood to reach two or more piausibir
meanings. Property Assistance Corp. 1
Roberts, 768 P.2d 976. 977 -Utah App.1989)
When a contract is ambiguous because of
uncertainty in the meaning of terms, the
absence of terms or other facial deficiencies, parol evidence is admissible to explain
the intent of the parties. Faulkner, 665
P.2d at 1293. Whether an ambiguity exists
is a question of law to be decided before
parol evidence may be admitted. Id. The
language of a contract is not necessarily
ambiguous merely because a party urges a
different meaning that is more in accordance with its own interests. Village Inn
Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah App.1990).

III. LEGAL NATURE OF
THE AGREEMENT
[1] The Larsons cite Colonial Leasing
Co. of New England v. Larsen Bros.
Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986),
for the proposition that the character of a
transaction, as a lease or a security agreement, "may be" ambiguous when taken as
a whole even though specific terms are
not.1 The supreme court identified numerous factors in Colonial Leasing that may
bear upon whether a lease or a security
agreement was intended.2
ment.
Among others, those factors are
whether (1) the lessor is a financier, (2) the
lessee is required to insure the goods in favor
of the lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of
loss or damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the
taxes, repairs, and maintenance, (5) the agreement establishes default provisions governing
acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial nonrefundable deposit is required, (7) the goods
are to be selected from a third party by the
lessee, (8) the rental payments were equivalent to the costs of the goods plus interest, (9)
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In addition to the presence of several
lease terms that were identified as factors
in Colonial Leasing, the Larsons note the
existence of an option to purchase the
equipment, and the treatment of their
home as "additional security" as indications that the parties intended a security
agreement. In LMV Leading, 305 ?.2d at
196, this court identified ownership (or its
functional equivalent) and the means to
transfer ownership (such as a purchase option) as a key distinction between a lease
and a security agreement.
Under the express language of the lease,
however, Dale Larson and Robert Lucking
acquired no ownership interest, right or
title in the equipment other than a leasehold:
9. OWNERSHIP, PERSONAL PROPERTY: Equipment is and shall at ail
times remain, the property of Lessor;
and Lessee shall have no right, tide or
interest therein or thereto except as expressly set forth in this Lease[.] Equipment is, and shall at all times be and
remain, personal property notwithstanding that Equipment or any part thereof
may now be, or hereafter become, in any
manner affixed or attached to real property or any building thereon.
Dale Larson and Robert Lucking were,
however, granted an option to purchase the
equipment for fair market value at the end
of the lease period:
11. OPTION TO PURCHASE: Lessee
shall have an option to purchase Equipment at the end of the lease period for
FAIR MARKET VALUE at the time plus
all obligations remaining due under this
Lease. Notice of exercise of this option
must be given in writing to Lessor or
Lessor's assignee at least thirty (30) days
prior to the expiration of the Lease.
the lessor lacks facilities to store or retake the
goods, (10) the lease may be discounted with
a bank, (11) the warranties usually found in
leases are omitted, and (12) the goods or
fixtures are impractical to remove
731 P.2d at 487 (citing J. White & R Summers,
Handbook of the Law Under the I niform Commercial Code 882-83 (2d ed. 1^80)). But see
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-20U37Nc) (1990) (negating impact of Colonial leasing factors (2),
(3), and (4)).

This option shall terminate and be avoid
[sic] upon termination of this lease by
reason of Lessee's default.
The issue thus presented is whether an
option to purchase leased equipment for
fair market value is indicative of a lease or
a security agreement. On this point, Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K37) (1980), provides:
Whether a lease is intended as security is
to be determined by che facts of each
case; however, (a) the inclusion of an
option to purchase does not itself make
the lease one intended for security, and
(b) an agreement that upon compliance
with the terms of the lease the lessee
shall become or has the option to become
the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
Under this statute, the inclusion of an
option is not necessarily determinative of
the character of an agreement. The critical factor is the economic value of the
consideration to be paid for the exercise of
an option. The treatment of a lease as a
true lease or a security agreement based
on the economic value of consideration to
be paid was further explained by a 1990
amendment to section 70A-1-201(37).3 The
statute now provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(b) Whether a transaction creates a
lease or a security interest is determined
by the facts of each case; however, a
transaction creates a security interest if
the consideration the lessee is to pay the
lessor for the right to possession and use
of the goods is an obligation for the term
of the lease not subject to termination by
the lessee, and:
3.

Retroactive application of Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-l-201(37)(b) (1990) to the issue before us
is permissible because the amendments merely
clarify or amplify the understanding of the former law. See Department of Social Servs. v.
Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982); Okland
Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208
(Utah 1974).
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i:

(iv) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional or nominal additional consideration bpon compliance with the lease
agreement.
(d) For purposes of this subsection:
(i) Additional consideration is not
nominal if ... when the option to become the owner of the goods is granted to the lessee the price is stated to
be the fair market value of the goods
determined at the time the option is to
be performed.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K37) (1990).
Although a lease with an option to purchase for no additional or nominal additional consideration constitutes a security
agreement under subsection (b)(iv). a purchase option at fair market value is not
nominal under the definition of additional
consideration in (d)(i). Since the purchase
option was not nominal and the Larsons
have not raised any argument with respect
to the economic life of the equipment,4 we
conclude that the lease is a true lease and
not a security agreement.
[2] Accordingly, we do not address the
commercial reasonableness of the sale because the lease is not a security agreement
and a commercially reasonable sale was not
required under the lease. In addition, we
dismiss the claim that failure to dispose of
the equipment in a commercially reasonable manner allowed for double recovery
and penalty since Overland is entitled to
recover amounts due under the lease after
offset from sale proceeds.5
IV. FRAUD AND DURESS CLAIMS
AGAINST OVERLAND
[3,4] On appeal, the Larsons argue
that they were induced to enter into the
4.

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-201(37)(b)(i)(iii); LMV Leasing, 805 P.2d at 196 n. 6.

5. The Larsons challenge the award of attorney
fees by the trial court as an additional issue on
appeal. The issue was not listed in the statement of issues presented for review in their
opening brief, but was raised for the first time
in their reply brief. Rule 24(c) of the Appellate
Rules of Procedure limits answers in a reply
brief to new matter in the appellee's brief. The
issue of attorney fees was not raised as new
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lease by the fraudulent representations of
Overland or its agents and that the question of reasonable reliance raises issues of
fact that preclude summary judgment. In
support of their argument, the Larsons refer in general to the allegations in the
amended pleadings, and the affidavit of
Grethe Larson. The Larsons also cite
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title
Ins. Co.. 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983)
(negligent misrepresentation); Pace v.
ParrisK 122 Utah 141, 247 ?.2d 273, 27475 ('Utah 1952) (fraudulent misrepresentation); and, Conder v. A.L. Williams and
Assocs. Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah App.
1987)
(fraudulent
misrepresentation).
However, the allegations referred to support both a claim of fraud as well as duress, and much of the confusion in this case
stems from the parties' failure to distinguish between the claims of fraud and duress.
Grethe Larson made several allegations
in her affidavit and the "Amended Fourth
Amended Complaint" that relate to fraud.
Grethe Larson alleges that PFC employee
Welling brought several unidentified documents to her home on November 20, 1984,
to close the deal on the equipment lease.
Grethe Larson claims Welling told her
about a separate agreement between Intermountain and PFC in favor of Overland to
"buy back" the equipment for $35,000 in
case of default, and that money from the
sale of the equipment would offset the
Larsons' total potential liability of $75,000
under the guaranty. Grethe Larson also
claimed that Welling said if monthly payments were made and there were no default, the guaranty would be released and
the Larson home would not be involved in
the transaction for more than a year.
matter, either directly or by inference, in appellee's brief. We decline consideration of the
argument, therefore, for failure to comply with
the briefing requirement of the rules. See
Christertsen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah
App. 1991); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of CaL,
746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App.1987). See
also Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960,
962 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988).
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Grethe Larson also made allegations that
related to duress. Grethe Larson alleged
that Welling insisted she sign the documents immediately, and that he held the
documents fast to the table with only their
signature blanks exposed. Grethe Larson
avers Welling told her there was no time to
read the documents and prevented her
from reading them. Grethe Larson also
said she was not told that a crust leea was
included among the documents ^ne signed.
Grethe Larson said she felt rusnea. but in
reliance on Weiling's representations.
signed both her name and her ausband's
name to the documents without reading
them or knowing what they really were.
After she executed the documents. Grethe
Larson claimed Welling took them with him
to be notarized and promised to return that
same day with copies. However. Grethe
Larson stated she was never given any
copies.
Grethe Larson was later deposed and
stated, among other things, that Welling
actually had handed her the documents,
and that she not only had the opportunity,
but could have read them if she wanted.
She also said Welling never told her she
could not read the documents, but that she
felt he was in a hurry and, for reasons of
her own, chose not to. On the basis of
these contradictions in her statements, Overland brought a motion for summary judgment that quoted from portions of the deposition at length. The trial court ruled
there was "no evidence" to support the
claims of "fraud, duress and so on."
In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 117273 (Utah 1983), the supreme court held that
when a party takes a clear position in a
deposition that is not later modified on
cross-examination, he may not raise contradictory statements in his own affidavit as
issues of fact unless he can explain the
discrepancy. Because of the contradictory
statements in her deposition that were not
later modified, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court on the issue of "duress and
so on/' However, since Overland's motion
for summary judgment addressed only
those statements relating to duress, we
decline to affirm summary judgment on the
fraud claim. Disposition of the duress

ciaim does not resolve the fraud claim, in
addition, Overland proffered no evidence to
counter the Larsons' allegations of agency
other than a bald assertion that it did not
exist.

Accordingly, there was no basis for the
trial court to grant summary judgment on
the issue of fraud. The trial court errea,
therefore, in dismissing the fraud claim
against Overland. We reverse and remana
the fraud ciaim for further proceedings.
V THE TRUST DEED
AS A CONDITIONAL
GUARANTY
[5] The Larsons argue that the trust
deed must be construed as a conditional
guaranty that obligates Grethe Larson to
answer for the debt of her husband and
Robert Lucking, the lessees, but only after
Overland first exhausts the security and
establishes a deficiency. Failure to exhaust the security, the Larsons claim, releases them from the guaranty and prevents foreclosure. See, e.g., Carrier Brokers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail, 751 P.2d 258,
261 (Utah App.1988) (a conditional guaranty is not immediately enforceable upon default, but requires some contingency to
happen to fix liability. The creditor may be
required by the terms of the guaranty to
pursue the debtor first or designated security, or both, and failure to do so releases
the guarantor.)
The Larsons' argument on conditional
guaranties, however, is not on point. The
Larson house was expressly pledged as
additional security in the equipment lease
and was secured by means of the trust
deed. The house is, therefore, subject to
foreclosure independent of the guaranty.
Inasmuch as Overland could have executed
against any and all security pledged. Overland could initiate foreclosure on the house
regardless of the nature of the guaranty.
VI. FRAUD CLAIMS AGAINST MILNE
AND WESTERN SURETY
[6] The Larsons appeal the dismissal of
their claims against Linda Milne, a notary,
and Western Surety, the bond company

LARSOiN v. OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN
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insuring Milne as a notary, for Milne's
false notarization and acknowledgment of
the trust deed. The Larsons claim the
trust deed was not*signed in Milne's presence and that proximate cause is an issue
of fact. The Larsons cite DeCamp v. Allen. 156 So.2d 661 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1963),
and Collins & Sons Fine Jewelry, Inc. v.
Carolina Safety Sys.t Inc., 296 S.C. 219,
371 S.E.2d 539 (App.1988). for the proposition that a notary who improperly authenticates a document that results in detrimental reliance by innocent third persons will
be liable for fraud.
Although the facts regarding execution
of the documents are in dispute, we are
required to adopt the Larsons' version for
purposes of this review. In order to prevail against summary judgment, however,
the Larsons must prove a causal connection
between the notarization and the loss of
their home.
An acknowledgment or other proof of
execution, such as a notarization, is a prerequisite to recording a deed of trust or
other conveyance of real property under
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1990). Recording protects the beneficiaries of a trust
deed against subsequent buyers by imparting notice, but neither recording nor notarization is a necessary condition to enforce
a trust deed between parties to a conveyance. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(3) (1990);
Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 (Utah
1983); Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014
(Utah App.1987). Accordingly, notarization
did not give Overland the right to foreclose
inasmuch as Overland could have foreclosed on the home whether or not the trust
deed was recorded. The Larsons, therefore, could not prevail on these facts because any improper notarization did not
create or alter the legal relationship between the Larsons and Overland.
[7] The Larsons offer absolutely no explanation as to how third parties relied on
the notarization and how the reliance

caused the Larsons to lose their home. Inasmuch as the Larsons could have lost
their home without any acknowledgment
and they offered no further explanation on
how the notarization caused them to lose
their home, or any other good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing
law, we deem the appeal on this issue to be
frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court -n favor of
Milne and Western Surety and grant them
single costs and reasonable attorney fees
to Milne and Western Surety pursuant to
their request under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33.
VII.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the agreement in this
case was a lease and not a security agreement. We conclude that the claim of duress was unsupported. We also conclude
that the house was subject to execution,
regardless of the nature of the guaranty,
because it was expressly pledged as security in the lease. Although we affirm these
rulings in favor of Overland, we reverse
the summary judgment on the claim of
fraud, and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings on that issue.
We also affirm the judgment of the trial
court on the claims against Milne and
Western Surety. We award them single
costs and reasonable attorney fees as requested under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, since the Larsons' appeal
against these parties is frivolous.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
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APPENDIX B

TITLE VII.
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.

Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision;-or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be settled
by the Supreme Court.
'

(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1989
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Signature of Trustee
1985

57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to recover balance due upon obligation for which trust deed was given
as security — Collection of costs and
attorney's fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided,
an action may be commenced to recover the balance
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was
given as security, and in such action the complaint
shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness
which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for
which such property was sold, and the fair market
value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering
judgment, the court shall find the fair market value
at the date of sale of the property sold. The court may
not render judgment for more than the amount by
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest,
costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale. In any action
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall
be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney
fees incurred in bringing an action under this section.
1985

48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability.
All partners are liable:
(1) Jointly and severally for everything
chargeable to the partnership under Sections
48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations
of the partnership; but any partner may enter
into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract.
las?

(37) (a) "Security interest" means an interest
in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by
a seller of goods, notwithstanding shipment
or delivery to the buyer as provided in Section 70A-2-401, is limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." The term also
includes any interest of a buyer of accounts
or chattel paper which is subject to Chapter
9 of this title. The special property interest of
a buyer of goods on identification of those
goods to a contract for sale under Section
70A-2-401 is not a "security interest," but a
buyer may also acquire a "security interest"
by complying with Chapter 9 of this title.
Unless a consignment is intended as security, reservation of title under the consignment is not a "security interest." A consignment in any event is subject to the provisions
on consignment sales provided in Section
70A-2-326.
(b) Whether a transaction creates a lease
or security interest is determined by the
facts of each case; however, a transaction
creates a security interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for the
right to possession and use of the goods is an
obligation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee, and:
(i) the original term of the lease is
equal to or greater than the remaining
economic life of the goods;
(ii) the lessee is bound to renew the
lease for the remaining economic life of
the goods or is bound to become the
owner of the goods;
(iii) the lessee has an option to renew
the lease for the remaining economic life
of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease
agreement; or
(iv) the lessee has an option to become
the owner of the goods for no additional
consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the
lease agreement.
(c) A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides that:
(i) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay the
lessor for the right to possession and use
of the goods is substantially equal to or
is greater than the fair market value of
the goods at the time the lease is entered
into;
(ii) the lessee assumes risk of loss of
the goods, or agrees to pay taxes, insurance, filing, recording, or registration
fees, or service or maintenance costs
with respect to the goods;
(iii) the lessee has an option to renew
the lease or to become the owner of the
roods:

(iv) the lessee has an option to renew
the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to
or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the use of the
goods for the term of the renewal at the
time the option is to be performed; or
(v) the lessee has an option to become
the owner of the goods for a fixed price
that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of
the goods at the time the option is to be
performed,
(d) For purposes of this subsection:
(i) Additional consideration is not
nominal if, when the option to renew the
lease is granted to the lessee, the rent is
stated to be the fair market Tent for the
use of the goods for the term of the renewal determined at the time the option
is to be performed, or when the option to
become the owner of the goods is granted
to the lessee the price is stated to be the
fair market value of the goods determined at the time the option is to be
performed.
(ii) Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than the lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease agreement if the option is
not exercised.
(iii) "Reasonably predictable" and "remaining economic life of the goods" are
to be determined with reference to the
facts and circumstances at the time the
transaction is entered into.
(iv) "Present value" means the
amount as of a date certain of one or
more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain. The discount
is determined by the interest rate specified by the parties if the rate is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the
transaction is entered into; otherwise,
the discount is determined by a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances of
each case at the time the transaction
was entered into.
(38) "Send" in connection with any writing or
notice means to deposit in the mail or deliver for
transmission by any other usual means of communication with postage or the cost of the transmission provided for and properly addressed,
and, in the case of an instrument, to an address
specified thereon or otherwise agreed, or if there
be none to any address reasonable under the circumstances. The receipt of any writing or notice
within the time at which it would have arrived if
properly sent has the effect of a proper sending.
(39) "Signed" includes any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing.
(40) "Surety" includes guarantor.
(41) "Telegram" includes a message transmitted by radio, teletype, cable, any mechanical
method of transmission, or the like.
(42) 'Term" means that portion of an agreement which relates to a particular matter.
(43) "Unauthorized signature or indorsement"
means one made without actual, implied, or apparent authority and includes a forgery.
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EQUIPMENT LEASE GUARANTY
"5SEE:

Robert J

« Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire EDM

LISSOR:

P.F.C., Inc.
291 West 5400 South, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107

.EASE NO.
504 5 5-5
"APE OF LEASE: 11-27-84
In order to induce P.F.C., Inc., hereinafter called the Lessor, to enter into the
cove referenced lease with Lessee, and to grant to the Lessee such renewals, extensions,
''orbearances, releases, or other relinquishment of legal rights as the Lessor may deem
^dvisable, and for other valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby duly
acknowledged, the undersigned, hereinafter call the Guarantor, who, if two or more in
.jnber, shall be jointly or severally bound, hereby guarantees as surety, absolutely and
.^conditionally, to the Lessor, its successors and assigns, the full and prompt performance
^f all the covenants, conditions, and agreements under the above-referenced lease, by the
"essee, Lessee's successors and assigns, and expressly agrees that the validity of this
.j^'eement and the obligations of the Guarantor hereunder shall in no way be terminated,
ffected, or impaired by reason of the granting by the Lessor of any indulgence to the
\essee or by reason of the assertion by the Lessor against the Lessee of any of the rights
jr remedies reserved to the Lessor pursuant to the provisions of such lease or otherwise
-vailabie. to the Lessor or by the release of the Lessee from any of the Lessee's obligations
under such lease by operation of law or otherwise, the Guarantor hereby waiving all
3uretyship defenses. The Guarantor further covenants and agrees that this guaranty shall
remain and continue in full force and effect as to any renewal, modification, or extension
?f such lease whether or not the Guarantor shall have .received any notice of or consented
zo such renewal, modification, or extension. The Guarantor further agrees that its liability
.jider this guaranty shall be primary, and that in any right of action which shall accrue to
he Lessor under such lease, the Lessor may at its option proceed against the Guarantor
<nd the Lessee, jointly or severally, and may proceed against the Guarantor without having
-jommenced any action against or having obtained any judgment against the Lessee.
The failure of the Lessor to insist in any one or more instances upon a strict performance
:r observance of any of the terms, provisions, or covenants of the aforesaid lease or to
exercise any right therein contained shall not be construed or deemed to be a waiver or
relinquishment for the future of such term, provision, covenant or right, but the same shall
:ontinue and remain in full force and effect. Receipt by the Lessor of rent with knowledge
->f the breach of any provision of such lease shall not be deemed a waiver of such breach.
'.'o subletting, assignment, or other transfer of such lease, or any interest therein, shall
.perate to extinguish or diminish the liability of the Guarantor under this guaranty, and
•;herever reference is made to the liability of the Lessee, such reference shall be deemed
likewise to refer to the Guarantor.
Ihe Guarantor hereby waives a trial by jury. This guaranty shall be deemed to have been
~aie in, and shall be interpreted and the right and liabilities of the parties determined,
In accordance with the laws of the State of Utah; and the Guarantor agrees and consents it
is and shall be subject to the courts of the State of Utah. All of the terms and provisions
lereof shall inure to tne benefit of the Lessor, its successors and assigns and shall be
binding upon the Guarantor, its successors and assigns.
~~*\ i^
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Individual Guarantors:
'Robert
Dbext J. Lucking <i>
Q^
Dale L. NLarson
s i n

T

^ • T - i * * <-«/^r\

W-

Corporate Guarantor:
-T7EST:
Name of Corporation
Secretary

By:
Title:
^_
(Have signed by President of Vice President)"

'If the Guarantor is a rcrccratlon. corooratp rpsnlnMnn mn<;t- h<» «nmni^c^ \

